An Argument for Ratification: Some Basic Principles of the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts by Fletcher, Justin P.
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
VOLUME27 1999 NUMBER3
AN ARGUMENT FOR RATIFICATION: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF THE 1994 INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS
Justin P. Fletcher*
CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 479
II. THE ROME AND MEXICO CONVENTIONS: A BRIEF SYNOPSIS ...... 481
A. The Rome Convention .................................. 482
B. Comparisons to the Mexico Convention .................... 484
C. An American Perspective: The Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws ....................................... 487
III. THE RENVOI DOCTRINE ..........................
A. The Problem of Renvoi ........................
B. The Exclusion of Renvoi Under the Rome Convention
C. Renvoi in the United States .....................
IV. FREEDOM OF CHOICE ...........................
A. Party Autonomy: An Introductory Note ...........
B. Party Autonomy Under the Rome Convention ......
C. Dpeqage Under Article 3 of the Rome Convention ..
......... 490
......... 491
......... 492
......... 492
......... 494
......... 494
......... 496
......... 50 1
" Justin P. Fletcher, L.L.B. (Hons.), J.D. Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and
Wales. The author worked in London for 4 Y2 years as a Solicitor, attorney, and counselor-at-
law. He is admitted to the Bar of the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Bar of the United
States District Court, Western District of Missouri. The author dedicates this article to his
parents, Brian and Angela Fletcher. The author would also like to thank Professor Franco
Ferrari for his assistance and comments in the writing of this article.
477
478 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 27:477
D. Variation of the Chosen Law Under Article 3 of the Rome
Convention ................ 502
E. Party Autonomy Under the Mexico Convention .............. 502
V. THE CLOSEST CONNECTION ................................. 504
A. The Principle of Closest Connection ....................... 504
B. D~peqage Under Article 4(1) of the Rome Convention ......... 505
C. Characteristic Performance Under Article 4(2) of the Rome
C onvention ........................................... 506
D. The Rebuttable Presumptions ofArticles 4(3) and (4) ......... 509
E. The Theory of "Closest Connection" Under the Mexico
Convention ........................................... 509
VI. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RATIFY THE MEXICO
C ONVENTION .............................................. 511
A. The Mexico Convention Constitutes a Body of International
Uniform Laws ........................................ 511
B. The Influence of the United States in Framing the Mexico
C onvention ........................................... 513
C. The Improvement the Mexico Convention Represents Over the
Principles of the Rome Convention ........................ 514
V II. CONCLUSION .......................................... 517
1999] ARGUMENT FOR RATIFICATION 479
I. INTRODUCTION
The Organization of American States (OAS)' Fifth Inter-American
Specialized Conference on Private International Law took place in Mexico
City, Mexico, from March 14-18, 1994.2 The General Assembly of the OAS
had met on four prior occasions, in 1975,' 1979, 4  1984,'
The OAS is the world's oldest regional organization, tracing its origins to the First
International Conference of American States that opened on April 14, 1890, in Washington,
D.C. The First International Conference established the International Union of American
Republics along with a Commercial Bureau to act as its Secretariat. In 1910, the International
Union became the Union of American Republics, and the Commercial Bureau reconfigured as
the Pan American Union. After World War II, the Ninth International Conference of American
States, held in Bogota, Colombia in 1948, adopted the Charter creating the OAS. The Charter
transformed the Union of American States into the OAS and the Pan American Union into its
General Secretariat. See Heidi V. Jimnez, htroductory Note to Organization of American
States: Integrated Text of the Charter As Amended by the Protocols of Buenos Aires and
Cartagena De Indias; the Protocol of Amendment of Washington; and the Protocol of
Amendment of Managua, done at Bogota, Colombia, 1948 (as amended 1967, 1985, 1992, &
1993) 33 I.L.M. 981. Thirty-five member states have since ratified the Bogota Charter as
amended: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See id. at 982.
2 See Organization of American States Fifth Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Private International Law: Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts, Mar. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 732, 732-39 [hereinafter Mexico Convention].
The First Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law [hereinafter
CIDIP-l] was held in Panama City between January 14-30, 1975. See First Inter-American
Specialized Conference on Private International Law, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 325. Six
Conventions were adopted at the Conference: the Inter-American Convention on the Legal
Regime of Powers of Attorney to be Used Abroad, id. at 325-28; Inter-American Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, id. at 328-32; Inter-American Convention on Conflict of
Laws Concerning Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Invoices, id. at 332-34; Inter-
American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Checks, id. at 334-36; Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, id. at 336-39; Inter-American Convention
on Letters Rogatory, id. at 339-43.
4 The Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law
[hereinafter CIDIP-Il] took place in Montevideo, Uruguay, from April 23 to May 8, 1979.
Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law, May 8, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 1211. Eight conventions were approved at the Conference: Inter-American Convention
on Conflicts of Laws Concerning Checks, id. at 1220-22; Inter-American Convention on
Conflicts of Laws Concerning Commercial Companies, id. at 1222-24; Inter-American
Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, id. at 1224-
27; Inter-American Convention on the Execution of Preventive Measures, id. at 1227-3 1; Inter-
American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, id. at 1231-34; Inter-
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1989,6 and has subsequently met once in 1996. On March 17, 1994, the
Mexico Convention7 adopted two conventions: a Convention on the Interna-
tional Traffic in Minors8 and the Inter-American Convention on the Law
Applicable to International Contracts.9 This article looks at the Inter-American
Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts. The article will
discuss some of the principles of private international law upon which the
Mexico Convention is premised. Based on these principles, the article argues
in favor of the convention's ratification by the United States Congress. 10
American Convention on Domicile of Natural Persons in Private International Law, id. at 1234-
36; Inter-American Convention on General Rules of Private International Law, id. at 1236-38;
Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, id. at 1238-47.
' The Third Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law
[hereinafter CIDIP-Ill] was held in La Paz, Bolivia from May 15-24, 1984. See Third Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Private International Law: Conventions and Additional
Protocol, May 24, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 459. The Conference adopted three Conventions: Inter-
American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the Adoption of Minors, id. at 460-64;
Inter-American Convention on Personality and Capacity of Judicial Persons in Private
International Law, id. at 465-67; Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International
Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, id. at 468-71; Additional Protocol
to the Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, id. at 472-83.
6 See Fourth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law, July 15,
1989, 29 I.L.M. 62 [hereinafter CIDIP-IV]. CIDIP-IV approved three conventions at the
Conference: Inter-American Convention on the International Return of Children, id. at 63-72;
Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, id. at 73-80; Inter-American Convention
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, id. at 81-90.
7 The convention was signed by representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, at 732.
' See Organization of American States Fifth Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Private International Law: Inter-American Convention on International Traffic in Minors, Mar.
18, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 721.
9 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, at 732. At CIDIP-IV, the Mexican delegation
submitted a draft convention. The conference adopted a set of principles for future deliberation
of the draft convention. An Inter-American Juridical Committee prepared a draft convention and
report in advance ofCIDIP-V that was deliberated upon and revised at a meeting held in Tuscon,
Arizona, in November 1993. This draft formed the basis of discussions at the Mexico
Convention. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The hIter-Anterican Convention on the Law Applicable
to International Contracts.- Some Highlights And Comparisons, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (1994);
see also Harold S. Burman, International Conflicts of Laws, The 1994 Inter-American
Convention on the Law Applicable to hternational Contracts, and Trends for the 1990's, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 377 n.29 (1995).
"o The United States delegation utilized general guidelines in considering the draft
Convention: "(a) the provisions were to be based on trade and commercial contract concerns,
rather than personal, labor, or other contracts; (b) rules were, when possible, intentionally to
favor trade facilitation; (c) commercial predictability and trade usages were to receive higher
priority than the neutral balancing of all parties' interests in possible litigation; (d) party
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The second part of the article affirms that the underlying premises of the
Mexico Convention are founded on the principles of private international law
enunciated in the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contrac-
tual Obligations. An overview of the two conventions illustrates this point.
The article draws comparisons between numerous overlapping provisions and
the similarity of the principles upon which each is based. American conflict
of law rules embodied within the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws are
compared to those embodied within the two conventions to lay a foundation
for ratification.
The third part of the article introduces the general principles of the doctrine
of renvoi and problems inherent in applying these principle to conflict-of-law
doctrine. The article seeks to explain why the doctrine of renvoi, within both
the Rome and Mexico Conventions, has been expressly omitted.
The fourth and fifth parts of the article, freedom of choice and closest
connection, respectively, form the central nexus upon which the article is
based. The doctrine of freedom of choice encompasses the internationally
recognized concept of party autonomy, the ability of the parties to choose the
applicable law of the contract. The similarity of principles underlying party
autonomy under each convention is explored. When the contracting parties
fail to make a valid conflict-of-law choice, each convention provides a
mechanism whereby the courts can choose the applicable law, namely, the
theory of closest connection. The subjective and objective criteria the framers
introduced into the Mexico Convention, in association with a reference to
international commercial law criteria such as UNIDROIT and CISG principles,
as well as the recognition of lex mercatoria, distinguish it from the Rome
Convention and provide the most persuasive arguments for ratification. The
last part of the article sets forth the various arguments in support of ratifica-
tion.
II. THE ROME AND MEXICO CONVENTIONS: A BRIEF SYNOPSIS
The framers of the Mexico Convention utilized the principles underlying
the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of
autonomy as to conflict-of-law was to receive maximum support; (e) correlation was to be
sought when appropriate with ongoing revisions in the Uniform Commercial Code." Burman,
supra note 9, at 378.
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1980" as their primary model and, to a lesser degree, used the United Nations
Conference on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods.' 2 For this reason, and to lay the foundation for the premises of this
article, the article discusses the influence the Rome Convention had on the
drafters of the Mexico Convention by way of a comparative analysis of the
underlying principles of each convention.
A. The Rome Convention
The Rome Convention was opened for signature on June 19, 1980.
3
Pursuant to article 29 of the convention, 4 following the deposit of the seventh
" See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature
June 19, 1980, 1980 0.1. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter Rome Convention]; see also Burman, supra note
9, at 377; Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract Conjlict-of-Law in the Americas, 45 AM. J. COMP. L.
195, 204 (1997). For an overview of the convention, see generally Mario Giuliano & Paul
Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contractual
Obligations, 1980 O.J. (C 282) [hereinafter Giuliano-Lagarde Report].
12 See U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Final Act, Apr.
10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 [hereinafter CISG]; see generally Gonzalo Parra-
Aranguren, Conflict of Law Aspects of the UNIDROITPrinciples of International Commercial
Contracts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1239 (1998); Hernany Veytia, The Requirement of Justice and
Equity in Contracts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1191 (1995); Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-filling Role
of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between
the Principles and the CISG, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1149 (1995); Juenger, supra note 9, at 382.
Friedrich K. Juenger served as an advisor to the United States delegation to CIDIP-V. See id.
at 393; see also Burman, supra note 9, at 377 (Harold S. Burman was the co-head of the
American convention with Peter H. Pfund).
" For a fuller discussion on the Rome Convention, see RICHARD PLENDER, THE EUROPEAN
CONTRACTS CONVENTION THE ROME CONVENTION ON THE CONFLICT-OF-LAW FOR CONTRACTS
(1991); PETER KAYE, THE NEW PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWOF CONTRACT OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (1993); PETER M. NORTH, CHESHIRE & NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(12th ed. 1992); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1992). See
generally Georges R. Delaume, The European Con vention on the LawApplicable to Contractual
Obligations: Why a Convention?, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 105 (1982); Patrick Ross Williams, The
EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. I
(1988); Paul Lagarde, The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations. An Apologia, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 91 (1982); Friedrich K. Juenger, The European
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: Some Critical Observations, 22
VA. J. INT'L L. 123 (1982); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Renvoi Among the Law Professors: An
American's View of the European View of American Conflict of Laws (ThehifluenceofModern
American Conflicts Theories on European Law), 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 99 (1982).
" "This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the third month following the
deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval ... for each signatory
State ratifying, accepting or approving at a later date on the first day of the third month
following the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval." Rome
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instrument of ratification, 15 the convention entered into force on April 1,
1991.16 The purpose of the convention is the continuation and unification of
private international law and the establishment of uniform rules concerning
the law applicable to contractual obligations. 7 The convention applies to
contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws
of different countries. 8 Accordingly, the convention is applicable to all
contracts in which the parties are from a member state, to all contracts where
a party is from a non-member state but has contracted with a party from a
member state, or, if the parties are both from non-member states, when a
conflict-of-law dispute is to be adjudicated before a court of a member state.
The Rome Convention is comprised of four principle parts: the autonomy
of contracting parties to select a law to govern their contracts; applicable law
based on closest connection of contracts with countries, in the absence of a
parties choice; safeguards for the operation of mandatory rules of law of
countries other than those of applicable law; and the principle and mechanism
of uniform interpretation of the convention as between differing contracting
states.
The scope of the convention is defined in the negative. Article 1 of the
convention expressly excludes questions involving the status or legal capacity
of natural persons (subject to article 11);'9 contractual obligations relating to
wills and succession;2" rights in property arising out of a matrimonial
relationship;2' rights and duties arising out of a family relationship, parentage,
marriages of affinity, including maintenance obligations in respect of children
who are not legitimate;2 2 obligations arising out of a bill of exchange, checks
and promissory notes, and other negotiable instruments to the extent that the
obligations arise out of their negotiable character;23 arbitration agreements and
Convention, supra note 1I, art. 29.
'5 The United Kingdom deposited its instrument of ratification on January 29, 1991. See
Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States is Not a Party, 31 I.L.M. 245
(1992).
16 See id. Ten states, including the United Kingdom, have ratified the convention: France
(Nov. 10, 1983); Italy (June 25, 1985); Denmark (Jan. 7, 1986); Luxembourg (Oct. 1, 1986);
Germany (Jan. 8, 1987); Belgium (July 31, 1987); the Netherlands (June 21, 1991); Ireland (Oct.
29, 1991); Greece (Sept. 29, 1988). See id.
'7 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, pmbl.
'8 See id. art. 1(1).
'9 See id. art. 1(2)(a).
20 See id. art. 1(2)(b).
21 See id.
22 See id.
2' See id. art. 1(2)(c).
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choice of forum agreements;2 4 issues arising under corporate law;25 questions
as to whether an agent is able to bind a principal; 26 the constitution of trusts
and the relationship between settlers, trustees and beneficiaries;27 evidence and
procedure (both subject and not subject to article 14);28 and certain insurance
contracts.29
B. Comparisons to the Mexico Convention
The correlation between the two conventions is evinced both in the
intention and purpose of each convention and their actual provisions. The
integral purpose of the Mexico Convention is akin to that of the Rome
Convention; it is to enhance the regional integration of private international
law between the member states and to accompany the regional integration that
has already occurred through the economic independence of its members.30
The Rome Convention, like all European Community Treaties, is the result of
a culmination of a hybrid mix of common law and civil law legal systems. In
comparison, the thirty-five states that have ratified the Bogota Charter, as
amended,3 likewise represent a diverse mix of common law and civil law
systems.32 The Mexico Convention, in following its European model, signaled
a major shift in traditional Latin American jurisprudence toward the concept
of party autonomy with the drafters of the convention embracing the academic
preponderance for party autonomy in Europe.33
24 See id. art. 1(2)(d).
25 See id. art. 1(2)(e).
26 See id. art. 1(2)(f).
27 See id. art. 1(2)(g).
28 See id. art. 1(2)(h).
29 See id. art. 1(3).
30 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.; see also Juenger, supra note 9, at 382.
3 See supra text accompanying note 1.
32 See Burman, supra note 9, at 379 n.32; see also Juenger, supra note 9, at 382 (stating
that the Mexico Convention, like the Rome Convention, commended itself as the work of
eminent scholars).
" See Juenger, supra note 9, at 387 nn.20 & 21; Burman, supra note 9, at 380. For a
discussion on the treatment of party autonomy by U.C.C. § 1-105(1) and the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(a) (1971), see generally Patrick J. Borchers, Forum
Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival Cruise: A Proposalfor Congressio-
nal Reform, 67 WASRi. L. REV. 55 (1992); Juenger, supra note 9, at 387-88; Linda S. Mullenix,
Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal
Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323 (1992); William M. Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines:
Forum Selection Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 40 Am. J. COMP. L. 977 (1992); Mitchell
Stocks, Risk of Loss Under the Uniform Connercial Code and the United Nations Convention
[Vol. 27:477
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A cursory glance at each convention reveals several contiguous provisions.
Article 14 of the Mexico Convention mirrors in near verbatim format article
10 of the Rome Convention in stipulating the scope of the applicable law of
the contract.34 In addition, the contractual obligations to which the Mexico
Convention is applicable, as defined in article 5, hold a close symmetry to the
contractual obligations enumerated in article I of the Rome Convention to
which the convention is deemed inapplicable. 35 Article 7 of the Mexico
Convention mirrors in part article 3(1) of the Rome Convention by allowing
the parties to a contract to choose the law governing the contract 6 Article 7
of the Mexico Convention further mirrors article 3(1) of the Rome Convention
in allowing the parties to a contract to either expressly or implicitly, through
their conduct, choose the law to govern the contract. 37 Furthermore, article 7
of the Mexico Convention provides for contractual d~pe 6ge, the application
of a different governing law to separate parts of a contract, in line with articles
3 and 4 of the Rome Convention.38 The Rome Convention applies the
principle of dpe9ige to the determination of the applicable law in default of
choice as it does to the determination of that law in-accordance with party
autonomy.3 9
The drafters of the Mexico Convention in article 8 again followed the line
taken by the Rome Convention by allowing the parties to a contract to change
the law applicable to the contract at any time, irrespective of whether the
parties initially chose the law applicable to the contract.4 ° In article 9, the
drafters of the Mexico Convention set out the basic rules for the determination
of the applicable law governing the contract in the event the parties did not
select an applicable law or their election proved ineffective. 4' In so doing, the
drafters adopted the "closest ties" rule found in article 4(5) of the Rome
Convention 2 In article 11 of the Mexico Convention, the drafters adopted the
principles embodied within article 7(1) of the Rome Convention stipulating
that the forum may take into account not only the mandatory rules of
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Comparative Analysis and Proposal for
Revision of UCC Sections 2-509 and 2-510, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1415 (1993).
14 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 14; Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 10.
'5 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 1.
36 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 7; Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(1).
17 SeeMexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 7; Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(1).
'8 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 7; Rome Convention, supra note II, arts. 3
& 4.
39 See PLENDER, supra note 13, at 106.
40 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 8; Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(2).
41 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 9.
42 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(5).
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decisions, but also, any strongly held policies of a foreign legal system to
which the contract has close ties.43
Both the Rome and Mexico Conventions exclude contractual issues relating
to negotiable instruments and arbitration.4' The exclusion of an effective
conflict-of-law provision relating to such contractual obligations would not
detract from the ratification of the Mexico Convention. The justification for
this exclusion can be found in the reasons enunciated for their omission from
the Rome Convention.45 The exclusion from the Rome Convention of
contractual obligations arising under negotiable instruments was premised on
the actual fallibility of the uniform rules within the convention itself.46 The
perceived fallibility of the uniform rules, at least with respect to negotiable
instruments, results from imprecise language. By their nature, negotiable
instruments require the applicable law to be identified with precision. Indeed,
the homogeneity of negotiable instruments lends itself to rules of greater
precision and less flexibility. Such precision was not possible under the Rome
Convention, which established general principles of private international law
applicable to contracts between parties from different states.47
Arbitration agreements and agreements as to the choice of court were
excluded from the scope of the Rome Convention for two main reasons. First,
such "matter[s] lie within the sphere of procedure and form part of the
administration ofjustice (exercise of State authority)" and secondly, "rules on
this matter might have endangered the ratification of the Convention., 48 In
addition, it was argued by the framers of the convention that arbitration and
choice of court agreements "were adequately covered by other international
" See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 11; Rome Convention, supra note 11, art.
7(l).
14 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. l(2)(c)-(d); Mexico Convention, supra note
2, art. 5(d)-(e).
" See Giuliano-Lagarde report, supra note 11.
46 See id.
47 See PLENDER, supra note 13, at 63 n. 19; Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11. The
report noted the following:
[I]n retaining this exclusion ... the Group took the view that the
provisions of the Convention were not suited to the regulation of
obligations of this kind. Their inclusion would have involved rather
complicated special rules. Moreover, the Geneva Conventions [to
which the United States is a signatory] govern most of these areas. Id.
4S Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 1I.
486 [Vol. 27:477
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agreements. '49 As the prior international agreements are open for ratification
by the member states of OAS, the same arguments for exclusion in the Rome
Convention apply to the Mexico Convention.
Finally, the Mexico Convention as with the Rome Convention expressly
excludes the doctrine of renvoi. 5°
C. An American Perspective: The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws
The theoretical principles of the Rome Convention that provide support for
the Mexico Convention 51 are present within the Restatement (Second) Conflict
of Laws. 52 The Rome Convention (and by implication the Mexico Conven-
tion) and the Restatement (Second) take similar approaches concerning
conflict-of-law theory as it relates to contracts. This lends support to an
argument that ratification of the Mexico Convention by the United States
would not have an adverse affect on its current rules of private international
law (conflict-of-law).
In adopting section 187 of the Restatement (Second), the various states in
the United States have adopted a rule akin to article 3 of the Rome Convention
and article 7 of the Mexico Convention, which allow the contracting parties to
4" PLENDER, supra note 13, at 66. The agreements referred to by the framers included
notably: The Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92
L.N.T.S. 302; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement-of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, arts. 2 & 5, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519-20, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 38-42. See also KAYE,
supra note 13, at 119-20.
so See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 17; Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 15.
SI See Burman, supra note 9, at 377; see also Hernany Veytia, The Requirement of Justice
and Equity in Contracts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1995); Juenger, supra note 9, at 393;
Juenger, supra note 11, at 207. In adopting the Rome Convention as its model, it is generally
perceived that the framers of the Mexico Convention have improved upon the provisions of the
Rome Convention. See generally Burman, supra note 9, at 377 ("[The Mexico] Convention
concluded with several innovations that give it a distinctive position in this category of
treaties."); Juenger, supra note 11, at 207-08 ("[T]he Mexico ... Convention's drafters put the
comparative method to good advantage; instead of merely copying, they created a superior
product."); Juenger, supra note 9, at 393 ("[l]f one compares the [Rome Convention and the
Mexico Convention] the Americas have amply justified their codificatory efforts by using the
comparative method to create a superior product.").
52 See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)]. The Restatement (Second) was adopted and promulgated by the American Law
Institute on May 23, 1969, and published in 1971.
The Restatement (Second) is applicable to international contracts under § 10. "The rules in
the Restatement of this Subject are also usually applicable to cases with elements in one or more
foreign nations. This is properly so since similar values and considerations are involved in both
interstate and international cases." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 10 cmt. c.
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a contract to choose the law governing the contract.5 3 Neither the Rome
Convention,5 4 the Mexico Convention," nor the Restatement (Second),56 in
defining their scope, define the ambit of "contractual obligation, 57 "interna-
tional contract,"58 or "contract." 59 Both the Rome and Mexico Conventions
leave the issue to be characterized by the contracting parties and, in default, to
the courts. The Restatement (Second) stipulates that "the term 'contract' is
used to refer both to legally enforceable promises and to other agreements or
promises which are claimed to be enforceable but are not legally so."
60
However, the Restatement (Second) does not characterize whether a transac-
tion is contractual.
61
The broad brush approach taken by both the Rome and Mexico Conven-
tions in delineating the parameters of their scope is mitigated to the extent that
each defines its scope in the negative. 6' The Restatement (Second) does not
contain an analogous provision to either article 1(2) of the Rome Convention
or article 5(a)-(f) of the Mexico Convention. 63 However, it can be implied, by
reason of omission, that a strong correlation exists between the scope of the
two conventions and the Restatement (Second). Additionally, contractual
issues relating to status and capacity, 64 negotiable instruments, 65 certain
insurance contracts, 66 and arbitration agreements 67 are expressly covered by the
scope of the Restatement (Second), and it can be argued that the matters
5' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187(1) ("The law of the state chosen by the parties to
govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied..."). See generally Samuel J. Cohen,
The EEC Convention and the U.S. Law Governing Conflict-of-Law for Contracts, With
Particular Emphasis on the Restatement Second: A Comparative Study, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 223, 224 (1989).
54 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 1.
" See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, at ch. 8 Introductory Note.
s See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 1 (1).
s See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
'9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, at ch. 8 Introductory Note.
60 id.
6 See Cohen, supra note 53, at 225-26.
62 See supra notes 19-29, 35..
63 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(2); Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art.
5(a)-(f.
64 See Restatement (Second), supra note 52, § 198.
65 See id. §§ 214-217.
66 See id. §§ 192-193.
67 See id. §§ 218-220.
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expressly excluded by the Rome and Mexico Conventions are excluded, by
reason of omission, from the scope of the Restatement (Second).6"
A further area of comparative similarity between the Rome Convention
(and by implication the Mexico Convention) and the Restatement (Second),
also lies within article 1(2) of the Rome Convention - the status and legal
capacity of natural persons. Pursuant to article l(2)(a) of the Rome Conven-
tion, the determination of the conflict-of-law pertaining to "questions
involving the status or legal capacity of natural persons... "69 save for the
exception carved out in article 11, falls within the ambit of the conflict-of-law
rules of the forum state.70 The exception in article 11 is narrow. It applies
only to contracts concluded between persons in the same country, and it
prevents a party from invoking the contractual defense of incapacity. There
is an exception if the one party was aware of the other party's lack of capacity
at the time the contract was concluded, or was unaware of the other party's
incapacity as a consequence of negligence.7' This has the added effect of
minimizing the potential of an unfair surprise, by limiting the scope of the
application of article 1(2)(a) to overcome the lack of a certain conflict-of-law
rule as to capacity in the convention. 72
The Restatement (Second) expressly addresses the issue of capacity. 73
Pursuant to section 198, the issue of whether the parties had legal capacity to
enter into a particular contract is determined by the law chosen by the parties,
if an effective choice has been made under section 187.14 Alternatively, the
issue is determined under section 188 by reference to the local law of the state,
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties under the principles found in section 6.7 The
Restatement (Second) protects a contracting party from unfair surprise when
68 See Cohen, supra note 53, at 226.
69 Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(2).
70 See PLENDER, supra note 13, at 57, 59; Cohen, supra note 53, at 227. For a critical
analysis as to the exclusion of contractual capacity from the Rome Convention, see KAYE, supra
note 13, at 112; LOSCH & STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 350
(1987).
7' See Rome Convention, supra note 11, at art. 22.
71 See Cohen, supra note 53, at 228; KAYE, supra note 13, at 113,311-19; PLENDER, supra
note 13, at 57-60.
73 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 198.
74 See id. at cmt. a.
'5 Seeid.;seealso id. § 188(1).
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faced with a defense of contractual incapacity on the grounds that the parties
failed to make an effective conflict-of-law in their contract. It does this by
subjecting the contract to the law chosen by the parties 76 or to the law of the
forum as set out in section 188(1).7
However, the application of the law of the forum state under section 188(1)
may produce an inequality between the parties not seen in article 1(2) of the
Rome Convention. The inequality arises because the party who resides in the
state with the most significant contacts to the contract (which results in the law
of that party's state being adopted) may lack the ability to ascertain the true
capacity of foreign parties to the contract. 7' The ratification of the Mexico
Convention has the potential to eradicate this problem first, as the convention
would automatically supersede the Restatement (Second) and second, for the
same reasons why the problem does not arise under the Rome Convention, it
would not arise under the Mexico Convention.
III. THE RENvoI DOCTRINE
The doctrine of renvoi allows a court to adopt a foreign country's conflict
of law rules instead of its own in determining the proper law to be applied to
a matter. 79 The doctrine is expressly excluded in both the Rome and Mexico
Conventions.8°
76 See id. § 187(l)-(2).
77 See Cohen, supra note 53, at 227-28.
71 See Cohen, supra note 53, at 227-28 nn.24-25.
79 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (6th ed. 1990). For a more detailed discussion of
the doctrine, see DICEY & MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 67-71 (10th ed. 1980); JOHN
WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 2 (7th ed. 1925); GEOFFREY CHESIRE & PETER
M. NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-76 (10th ed. 1979); MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 178-95 (2d ed. 1950); A.E. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW(A
TREATISE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SCOTS LAW) (1967); JOHN P. FALCONBRIDGE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS ch. 6-10 (2d ed. 1954); WALTER W. COOK, LOGICAL AND
LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICT OF
LAW 166 (3d ed. 1977); Erwin N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1938);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Renvoi Among the Law Professors: An American View ofthe European
View ofAmerican Conflict of Laws, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 99, 106 (1982).
For an overview of the theoretical debate among American conflict of law scholars on renvoi
since the early 19th century see Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979
(1991); see also Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 29 F.R.D. 490,500 (S.D. Ind. 1962);
Cooper v. Cherokee Village Development Co., 364 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Ark. 1963).
SO See Rome Convention, supra note I1, art. 15; Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 17.
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A. The Problem of Renvoi
The proper law of a contract is the law of a country where a person is
domiciled. This means the domestic law of that country or, when applied to
a foreign country, the domestic law of that foreign country and any domestic
law that the laws of that foreign country would apply to the decision of the
case to which the rule refers to.8 The problem of renvoi is aptly illustrated by
the following passage: "[it] arises whenever a rule of the conflict of laws refers
to the 'law' of a foreign country, but the conflict rule of the foreign country
would have referred the question to the 'law' of the first country or to the 'law'
of some third country.""2 The problem inherent in the doctrine of renvoi arises
because of a conflict between the conflict rules of different countries. The
result can mean the matter being passed backwards and forwards between each
jurisdiction. For example, if the English conflict rule stipulates that a matter
is to be governed by the law of domicile, but the foreign country conflict rule
stipulates that the issue is governed by the law of nationality, the issue can
potentially pass from the jurisdiction of the English courts to that of the
foreign country and so forth.83
Thisjurisdictional ping-pong can be resolved through either the theories of
single or double renvoi. However, the application of either theory will not
eliminate the problem arising in the first place. The former applies, for
example, in instances when the conflict rule of the foreign country refers the
matter back to the law of the English courts or to that of a third country. The
English court would then have the option to accept the reference and in so
doing apply English domestic law or the law of the third country. The latter
theory arises when, for example, the English court resolves the matter as it
would have been resolved by the court of the foreign country. If the foreign
court in applying its conflict rules would apply English law, then the English
court would apply English domestic law. If the foreign court would accept
English conflict rules, then the English court would apply the domestic law of
that foreign country. 4
"' See DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 79, at 64.
82 Id. at 65.
s See id. at 32, 65.
s For a fuller discussion on the theories of single and double renvoi, see generally DICEY
& MORRIS, supra note 79, at 65-67; CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 79, at 59; FALCONBRIDGE,
supra note 79, at 173-74.
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B. The Exclusion of Renvoi Under the Rome Convention
Article 15 of the Rome Convention expressly excludes renvoi. Accord-
ingly, the domestic rules of contract law of a country under the convention
control a contract as opposed to that country's particular conflict of law rules.
Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention85 stipulates that the Rome Convention
only applies to contractual obligations where the parties have a choice between
the laws of different countries. The parties can explicitly make this choice
under article 3,86 or, in the absence of an express choice, the contract will be
governed by the law of the country with which the contract is most closely
connected. 7
Where the parties to a contract have chosen the law to be applied under
article 3, there is no place for renvoi. When the parties have chosen the law
to govern the contract it is done with the intent that the provisions of the
chosen law will be applicable. This in itself excludes any possibility of renvoi
to another law.88 Even if the parties do not choose the law that will govern the
contract, renvoi is also excluded. The reasoning lies within article 4(2).
Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention creates a presumption that the country
most closely connected to the contract is the country, at the time the contract
concludes, where the party who is to effect the performance of the contract has
its habitual residence.89 It is unreasonable for a court to subsequently subject
a contract to the law of another country by introducing renvoi for the sole
reason that the conflict-of-laws rule in the country where the contract is
localized contained other connecting factors.9"
C. Renvoi in the United States
Whenever a forum state must consider a foreign law, the question as to the
role a forum state should give the foreign state's conflict-of-law rules is:
" See Rome Convention, supra note II, art. 1(1).
86 See id. art. 3.
7 See id. art. 4.
88 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11. This view has been adopted, among
others, by France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, and the Benelux countries. See id.
89 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(2).
90 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11. The framers of the Rome Convention are
of the view that the exclusion of renvoi was justified in any convention regarding conflict of
laws. "If the Convention attempts as far as possible to localize the legal situation and to
determine the country with which it is most closely connected, the law specified by the conflicts
rule in the Convention should not be allowed to question this determination of place." Id.
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should the forum state consider only the foreign state's substantive laws or the
whole law of the foreign state, including that state's conflict-of-law rules?
This issue has preoccupied American conflict-of-law scholars for most of this
century, without any clear resolution.9' In the early half of this century, the
consensus concluded that the forum should ignore the foreign state's conflict-
of-law rules.92 However, on the whole, the judiciary generally ignored
renvoi.93 The latter half of this century has evinced a shift in conflict-of-law
jurisprudence with the rise in prominence of the "policy analyst." The policy
analysts resolved the renvoi debate by applying the internal law of the foreign
state, thus eliminating the issue in tOtO.
94
The approach of the Restatement (Second) to renvoi is dependent on
whether the parties to the contract have chosen the law to govern the contract.
It allows the parties to the contract to specify the application of renvoi to the
contract. 95 In the event the parties to the contract fail to indicate an intention
regarding renvoi, the Restatement (Second) imputes a presumption that renvoi
is not applicable.96 When the parties to the contract do not specify the law to
govern the contract, the Restatement (Second) does not apply renvoi.97 In the
absence of an effective conflict-of-law, the conflict-of-law rules refer to the
local law for determining the law that governs the contract. 98 The limitation
of renvoi by the Restatement (Second) is justified due to the uncertainty
created by the doctrine's application and the infrequent occasions when renvoi
is applicable to contract law. 99
9' See Kramer, supra note 79, at 98 1.
92 See JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ONTHE CONFLICTOF LAWS 57 (1935); Ernest Lorenzen,
The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 190 (1910); Walter
Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases ofthe Conflict ofLaws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924).
But see Erwin Griswold, A Distinction in the Renvoi Doctrine, 35 HARV. L. REV. 454 (1922);
Griswold, supra note 79, at 51, HERBERT GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(3d ed. 1949). For a summary of these opposing views, see generally Kramer, supra note 79,
at 980-81.
9' See Kramer, supra note 79, at 981.
94 See id. For a critical appraisal of the modem American approach to renvoi, see Kramer,
supra note 79. To resolve the renvoi problem, one must explain precisely how conflict-of-law
rules allocate lawmaking power. This.explanation reveals conflict-of-law rules not as external
limitations on the power to prescribe, but rather as efforts first to define and then to accommo-
date the legitimate policy objectives of different states. Id.
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 1 87.
96 See id. § 187(3).
9' See id. § 188; see also id. at cmt. g.
98 See id. at cmt. g. "Local law" does not encompass a state's conflict-of-law rules.
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 186(b).
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The Mexico Convention, like the Rome Convention, excludes the doctrine
of renvoi in determining the law applicable to international contracts by
stipulating "law" to mean the applicable law in a state.' ° As such, the
ratification of the Mexico Convention, inter alia, with its exclusion of renvoi,
would not encroach upon current American conflict-of-lawjurisprudence' or
the Restatement (Second), save for the flexibility of the parties to expressly
submit themselves to a foreign state's conflict-of-law rules. Due to the
uncertainty this creates in any event, its exclusion is arguably a better option.
IV. FREEDOM OF CHOICE
A. Party Autonomy: An Introductory Note
The genesis in Europe for the recognition of party autonomy was visible as
long ago as the 17th century."°2 The subsequent formation of what is now the
European Union, in turn, saw a movement for a drawing together and
harmonization by the member states of their conflict-of-law rules. The
outcome was unification under the auspices of the 1980 Rome Convention.° 3
Article 3 therein recognizes the principle of party autonomy.0 4 It provides,
inter alia, that parties to a contract have the freedom to choose the applicable
law to govern the contract. In the absence of a valid choice of applicable law
'oo See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, at art. 17.
101 See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.13 (2d ed. 1992) (stating
that American courts employ renvoi only in limited circumstances); Brad Karp, The Litigation
Angle in Drafting Commercial Contracts, 913 PRAC. L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAC. HANDBOOK
SERIES 39, 61 (most jurisdictions do not apply renvoi); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 5
(1998) ("The doctrine ofrenvoi has been repudiated by many American authorities."); Kramer,
supra note 79, at 982:
[P]olicy analysts responded to this problem by offering a broader
approach to conflict-of-law that they claimed eliminates the renvoi
problem altogether. .. According to modem conflict-of-law scholars,
foreign conflict-of-law rules can be ignored because legislative
jurisdiction should be allocated based on the policies underlying the
substantive laws at issue, and general conflict-of-law rules were not
developed with these policies in mind.
..2 See Juenger, supra note 11, at 199 ("As early as the 17th century, Dumoulin espoused
... the notion of party autonomy.., that would control should the parties have failed to avail
themselves of their power to designate the applicable law.") See also infra note 107, regarding
the vagaries of the principle of party autonomy in each Member State.
03 See Juenger, supra note I1, at 200.
'0' See Rome Convention, supra note 11, at art. 3.
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by the parties, article 4, which follows the English proper law principle,
invokes the law having the closest connection to the contract.1
05
In contrast, the path to party autonomy has been somewhat more tortuous
in both Latin America and the United States.' °6 In America, conflict-of-law
jurisprudence found itself shackled beneath the Bealeist doctrine of conflict of
laws.'0 7 As Beale was the Reporter of the Restatement (First) Conflict of Laws
(1934), the Bealeist doctrine was, not unexpectedly, emulated therein.'0 8 By
the latter half of this century, the principle of conflict-of-law supported by
Beale and other eminent scholars was replaced by a theory premised on policy
analysis'0 9 expounded by such eminent scholars as Brainerd Currie."' The
movement away from conflict-of-law theory premised upon the principle of
territoriality"' to modem conflict-of-law theory based on the English notion
of the proper law of the contract (the law of the state with which the contract
has the closest connection)," 12 saw acceptance in the American courts" 3 and
subsequently in the Restatement (Second)."l 4 "At the same time, American
'0o See Juenger, supra note 1I, at 200.
'6 See id. at 196 (discussing the backwardness of Latin American conflict-of-law
jurisprudence); id. at 197 (discussing the development of party autonomy in the United States);
Kramer, supra note 79, at 979.
07 The underlying premise of Beale's doctrine is that "private parties lack the power to 'do
the legislative act' of substituting their decision on what law should apply for that of the
legislature and that such power would be 'theoretically indefensible.'" Juenger, supra note 11,
at 197. Beale wrote:
The question whether a contract is valid ... can on general principles
be determined by no other law than ... by the law of the place of
contracting.... If... the law of the place where the agreement is made
annexes no legal obligation to it, there is no other law which has power
to do so.
BEALE, supra note 92, at 1079, 1083, 1091.
o See Juenger, supra note 11, at 197.
109 See Kramer, supra note 79, at 981.
"o See id. at 982, 1003-12. For a critical attack on modern American conflict-of-law
theory, see Kramer, supra note 79, at 982, 1003-12. "According to modern conflict-of-law
scholars, foreign conflict-of-law rules can be ignored because legislativejurisdiction should be
allocated based on the policies underlying the substantive laws at issue, and general conflict-of-
law rules were not developed with these policies in mind." Id. at 982. Also, "both explanations
offered by interest analysts for ignoring foreign conflict-of-law rules must be rejected." Id. at
1011.
... See Kramer, suepra note 79, at 982.
112 See Juenger, supra note 11, at 198.
". SeeAustin v. Austin, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954); Juenger, supra note 11, at 198.
"4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 188(l) ("The rights and duties of the
parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties
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judges also followed their English colleagues in recognizing party
autonomy."' " The principle of party autonomy in the United States has been
codified in both the Uniform Commercial Code" 6 and the Restatement
(Second). "7
B. Party Autonomy Under the Rome Convention
Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention declares: "[A] contract shall be
governed by the law chosen by the parties.""' 8 This embodies the doctrine of
party autonomy." 9 Article 3 is a liberal provision that gives multinational
parties to a contract considerable freedom and ability to specify the applicable
law to govern the contract. 20  Party autonomy is a generally recognized
principle that has been incorporated into the provisions of numerous
international treaties. '2' The application of the doctrine to the selection of the
under the principles stated in § 6."). See Juenger, supra note 11, at 198.
"1 Juenger, supra note 11, at 198; see Seigelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189
(2d Cir. 1955); Overseas Trading Co. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 382 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
116 See U.C.C. § 1- 105(1) (1990). See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (4th ed. 1995) (outlining basic content of UCC and analyzing
growing case law).
"7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 187 (the law of the state chosen by the
parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one
that the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that
issue).
... Rome Convention, supra note I1, art. 3(1).
"9 See PLENDER, supra note 13, at 87-102; KAYE, supra note 13, at 147-70; I.G.F. Baxter,
hzternational Business and Choice-of- Law, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 92 (1987); Cohen, supra
note 53, at 3; R. Weintraub, How To Chose a Law for Contracts aind How Not to, 17 TEXAS INT.
L.J. 155 (1982); Williams, supra note 13, at 4.
20 See H. Matthew Horlacher, The Rome Convention and the German Paradigm:
Forecasting the Demise of the European Treaty on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 177 (1994). The few restrictions on party autonomy
in the Rome Convention are found in articles 3(3), 5(2), 6(l), 9(6), 7 & 16. See Rome
Convention, supra note 1I.
121 See Franco Ferrari, Recent Development: CISG Specific Topics ofthe CISG in the Light
ofJudicial Application and Scholarly Writing, 15 J.L. & CoM. 1 (1995). Ferrari discusses party
autonomy under CISG, supra note 12, and the 1964 Hague Convention. The Hague Convention
approved two conventions: the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964,
834 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter ULIS] and Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter ULF].) Ferrari writes:
By providing for [party autonomy] the draftsmen of the Convention de
quo reaffirmed one of the general principles embodied in the 1964
Hague Convention, that is, the principle according to which the primary
source of the rules governing international sales contracts is party
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applicable law to apply to a contract is a universally recognized principle.112
Thus, the inclusion of party autonomy in article 3(1) of the Rome Convention
is but a simple reaffirmation of a principle currently embraced in the private
international law of most countries.' Indeed, it is suggested by Friedrich
Juenger that the principle of party autonomy appeared as long ago as 1074 as
a result of a conflict-of-law clause being inserted into the marriage contract
between El Cid, the Castilian reconquistador, and the lady from Le6n whom
he wed that year. 2 4 Upon the inclusion of party autonomy in the Rome
autonomy. Thus the drafters clearly acknowledged the Conventions
dispositive nature and the "central role which party autonomy plays in
international commerce and, particularly, in international sales.
Ferrari, supra note 121, at 84-85. The Hague Conventions were enacted in Belgium, Great
Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Gambia, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
and San Marino. See Hague Convention, reprinted in 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 453 (1954). See also
Ferrari, supra note 121, at 7 n.22, for an amusing riposte to Harold J. Burman, The Law of
International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 J. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 235, 290
n.160 (1988), which sets forth the nations having ratified the conventions.
CISG was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations at the diplomatic
conference in Vienna held from March 10 to April 11, 1980. See CISG, supra note 11. CISG
entered into force on January 1, 1988, and has been ratified by some fifty nations. For a detailed
list of those nations and dates of ratification, see Ferrari, supra note 121, at 13 n.66.
For other international treaties that have also adopted the rule of freedom of choice, see
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, art. 8, 484
U.N.T.S. 349 (stating that the parties are free to determine the law that the arbitrators must apply
in a dispute); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 42, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (stating that the Tribunal
shall rule on the dispute in accordance with the rules of law adopted by the parties); Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency, Mar. 14, 1978, art. 5, English text reproduced
in 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 438 (1978) (noting that the internal law chosen by the principal and the
agent is to govern the agency relationship between them).
122 See Ferrari, supra note 130, at 40 ("As far as the [Rome] Convention's recognition of
party autonomy (in the sense of conflict-of-law) is concerned, its employment should not raise
any problems, it being a concept universally recognized throughout domestic private
international law codifications long before the [Rome] Convention's coming into force."); see
also Williams, supra note 13, at 11 ("The freedom afforded to the contracting parties by the
[Rome Convention] to choose the law to govern the contract is a rule currently prevailing in the
private international law of all Member States and also in most other countries."); Ole Lando,
New American Conflict-of-Law Principles and the European Conflict ofLaws of Contracts, 30
AM. J. COMP. L. 19, 40 (1982) ("[the doctrine of party autonomy belongs] to the common core
of the legal systems").
2 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note I.
124 See Friedrich K. Juenger, The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations. An Anerican Assessmenl, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS: THE EEC CONVENTION ON THE
LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 295, 297 (P.M.
North ed., 1982); KAYE, supra note 13, at 147.
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Convention, the issue as to whether or not the parties intended that choice of
applicable law to govern an interpretation of the applicable law of the contract
was settled.2 5 Pursuant to article 3(1), the contract is governed by the law
chosen by the parties, which choice must be expressed or demonstrated with
reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the
case. 2 6 "The choice cannot be set aside on the ground that the parties have
selected a system regarded by a court as arbitrary, whether because it is
unconnected with the contract or otherwise."'
' 27
The convention imposes but two limits on party autonomy neither of which
acts as more than a partial restraint. 128 First, the mandatory rules of law set out
in articles 3(3), 129 5(2), 130 6(1),13 1 9(6), 132 and 7133 will override the parties
125 The issue as to whether or not the parties were free to stipulate by what law the validity
of their contract was to be governed was unclear under English law. See PLENDER, supra note
13, § 5.03-5.04. See generally Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note I I (discussing party
autonomy under the law of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
England).
126 See Rome Convention, supra note 1I, art. 3(1).
27 See PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.04.
128 See KAYE, supra note 13, at 148.
129 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(3):
The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or not
accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all the
other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are
connected with one country only, prejudice the application of rules of
the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by the contract,
hereinafter called mandatory rules.
30 See id. art. 5(2): "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a conflict-of-law made
by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to
him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence."
"3 See id. art. 6(1): "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, in a contract of
employment a conflict-of-law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the
employee of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be
applicable under paragraph 2 in the absence of choice."
132 See id. art. 9(b):
Notwithstanding paragraphs 1-4 of this article, a contract the subject
matter of which is a right in immovable property or a right to use
immovable property shall be subject to the mandatory requirements of
form of the law of the country where the property is situated if by that
law those requirements are imposed irrespective of the country where
the contract is concluded and irrespective of the law governing the
contract.
" See id. art. 7(l):
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may
be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with
which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the
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conflict-of-law in stipulated circumstances. Second, under article 16, the rules
of the chosen law of the contract may be refused by a court if the application
of those rules would be incompatible with the public policy of the forum. 134
Hence, article 16 can override the parties choice of conflict-of-law.
Though under article 3(1) of the convention the parties' freedom to choose
the applicable law to govern the contract is without restriction, this freedom
is subject to a caveat under article 3(3). Where the parties choose a law that
will circumvent the mandatory rules of a country whose laws would, within
reason be applicable, the parties' freedom to choose an applicable law to
govern the contract is curtailed if each of all the other elements relevant to the
situation are connected to one country only. 135
Articles 5 and 6 of the convention resulted from the drafters' concern that
traditionally weaker parties in consumer contracts (buyers) and contracts of
employment (employees) be protected from adverse conflict-of-law clauses. 36
Article 7 of the convention permits the parties to apply the mandatory rules of
one country as opposed to the system of law of another country chosen by the
parties where the first has a close connection to the contract. 131 Article 7 can
be distinguished from article 3(3) on the basis that it requires the contract to
have just a close connection to the country before the mandatory rules under
the convention become applicable. By contrast, article 3(3) requires all
elements, other than the conflict-of-law clause, to be connected to a country
prior to the mandatory rules becoming applicable. "The rationale of Article
7 lies in an interests analysis; if a State has a strong enough interest in a
contract, application of its laws is compelled, regardless of the governing
law .'
138
Article 3(1) of the convention, in addition to recognizing an express
conflict-of-law of the parties applicable to the contract, recognizes that a court
can, in light of all of the facts, find that the parties have made a real conflict-
law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law
applicable to the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these
mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to
the consequences of their application or non-application.
'14 See id. art. 16.
'" See id. art. 3(3).
136 See Horlacher, supra note 120, at 179; Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11;
PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.21.
137 See Rome Convention, supra note I1, art. 7.
"8 Horlacher, supra note 120, at 179-80.
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of-law not expressly stated in the contract."' Thus, a court may find the
parties have, within the four comers of the contract, chosen the applicable law
to govern the contract. 4 ° It is the word "choice" in article 3(1) that is
imperative to the notion of an implied conflict-of-law. The presence of a
choice by the parties to the contract prevents a court, in the absence of an
express conflict-of-law, from reverting to the default provision in article 4 that
looks to the most closely connected country's law. Instead, article 3(1) points
a court in the direction of ascertaining whether the parties have at some stage
evinced an intention as to a particular law to govern the contract. 141
The standard a court must utilize in assessing the parties implied conflict-
of-law is reasonable certainty.142 The standard is a subjective one influenced
by several factors the drafters of the convention anticipated a court should
consider in its determination.143 Such factors, as identified in the Giuliano-
Lagarde Report, include: the contract is a standard form of contract and the
parties are aware that it is governed by a particular system of law; there exists
a prior course of dealings between parties under contracts containing express
conflict-of-law clauses; there is a choice of forum clause in a contract that is
unambiguously indicative of an intention by the parties to subject the contract
to the law of that forum; there is an express reference to a country's legislative
provisions within the contract; there exists an express conflict-of-law provision
in related transactions existing between the same parties; and the presence in
the contract of the choice of a place where disputes are to be settled by
arbitration in circumstances indicating that the arbitrator should apply the law
of the place. 144
'9 See Rome Convention, supra note II, art. 3(1): "The choice must be expressed or
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the
case."
140 See Giul iano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11; KAYE, supra note 13, at 149. In contrast,
Professor Diamond asserts that article 3(l) is not intended to introduce the possibility of an
implied conflict-of-law. See Aubrey L. Diamond, Conflict of Laws in the EEC, 32 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 155, 160 (1979); see also PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.06.
141 See KAYE, supra note 13, 149.
142 See Rome Convention, supra note I1, art. 3(l).
143 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, sUpra note 11. Plender draws an interesting comparison
with article 31 (2)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to illustrate the wide
support for the proposition that "in ascertaining the intentions of the parties to a contract, there
shall be taken into account any subsequent practice in the application of the contract which
establishes the agreement of the parties, at the time of its conclusion." PLENDER, supra note 13,
§ 5.11.
144 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11. In relation to arbitration agreements, the
applicable law relating to the arbitration agreement may defer to the implied law found to govern
the contract as a whole. See PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.08.
500 [Vol. 27:477
ARGUMENT FOR RATIFICATION
C. Ddpegage Under Article 3 of the Rome Convention
Dpegage is the process whereby different issues in a matter that arose out
of a single set of facts are decided based on the laws of different states. Under
a d~pegage conflict-of-law theory, a court will consider issues over which rule
of law is applicable to each issue. 4 5 In other terms, d~pegage is a principle of
law by which a court is required, in determining an issue with a foreign
element, to identify the system of law most appropriately applicable to govern
each particular issue. The result, however, may lead to different systems of
law governing separate issues in a case. 46 The principle of d~pegage is
embodied in article 3(1) of the convention but to a much more limited extent
than the principle generally connotes. 147 As utilized by the drafters of the
convention, d~pe9age is but a logical conclusion to the principle of party
autonomy. On the same premise that a conflict-of-law must be identifiable
with reasonable certainty, likewise on the severability of a contract where each
part of a contract is governed by a different conflict-of-law, that conflict-of-
law must be similarly identifiable.
41
It must be borne in mind that the law governing an arbitration agree-
ment may not be the same as that governing the contract to which it
relates. If the arbitration is to be held in the territory of a state which is
a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the law governing the validity of the
arbitration agreement will normally be that of the country where the
award is to be made.
Id. But cf SIR M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN ENGLAND 63 (2d ed. 1989) (noting that "[t]he presumption [in favor of the country where the
award is to be made] would. .. readily be rebutted in favor of the proper law of the underlying
contract").
'45 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (6th ed. 1990).
146 See PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.13.
147 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(1) ("By their choice the parties can select
the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract."). In adopting such a limited
version of the principle, the drafters of the convention have followed the lead set by article 7(l)
of the Hague Convention of December 22, 1986:
A contract of sale is governed by the law chosen by the parties. The
parties' agreement on this choice must be express or be clearly
demonstrated by the terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties,
viewed in their entirety. Such a choice may be limited to a part of the
contract.
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
supra note 12. See also PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.13 (discussing the normally broad
connotation of d6pegage in private international law).
148 See PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.13; Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11.
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D. Variation of the Chosen Law Under Article 3 of the Rome Convention
Article 3(2) of the convention provides, inter alia, that the "parties may at
any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously
governed it.' 149 The agreement to subject the contract to a new law can be
made either during the performance of the contract, at its conclusion, or during
the course of legal proceedings. 5 0
[T]he rule now embodied in article 3(2) ...promotes
commercial convenience: if the parties choose to alter the
applicable law, they will do so because they judge that it
suits their shared interests. . . . No useful purpose is
served in denying the parties the opportunity to vary the
applicable law, when they can always achieve the same
end by terminating the original contract and making a new
one subject to a different legal system."'
E. Party Autonomy Under the Mexico Convention
The principle of party autonomy can be found in article 7 of the Mexico
Convention.'5 The first sentence of article 7 parallels article 3(1) of the Rome
Convention that, in itself, embodies the doctrine of party autonomy. The third
sentence of article 7 provides for contractual d~pegage in line with the third
sentence in article 3(1) of the Rome Convention. The second sentence in
... Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(2). PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.15. "This rule
like d~pegage, is a further expression of the principle of party autonomy." Id.
so See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11; see also KAYE, supra note 13, at 155:
The ... purpose of Article 3(2) would appear to be to provide a
conflict-of-law rule whereby parties are permitted to avail them-
selves of the power in Article 3(1) to select a law to govern their
concluded contract, expressly or implicitly ... and subsequent to
conclusion, where the law so chosen differsfrom the law otherwise
applicable thereto.
151 PLENDER, supra note 13, § 5.15.
152 Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 7:
The contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The
parties agreement on this selection must be express or, in the event that
there is no express agreement, must be evident from the parties'
behavior and from the clauses of the contract, considered as a whole.
Said selection may relate to the entire contract or to a part of same.
For a comparison to the Rome Convention, see supra pp. 481-487. See also Juenger, supra note
9, at 386-88; Burman, supra note 9, at 380.
ARGUMENT FOR RATIFICATION
article 7 makes provision in accordance with the second sentence in article
3(1) of the Rome Convention for a court to impliedly find the parties have
chosen the applicable law to govern the contract. The standard under the
Mexico Convention that a court must utilize in ascertaining an implied intent
is arguably subjective and objective. The provision that, "[i]n the event that
there is no express agreement, [it] must be evident from the parties' behavior"
connotes a subjective standard. In contrast, "from the clauses of the contract,"
imputes an objective standard. As to the basis for implying conflict-of-law,
article 7(2) of the Mexico Convention provides that the "selection of a certain
forum by the parties does not necessarily entail selection of the applicable
law."'53 "Though phrased negatively, this provision in effect incorporates the
English presumption qui elegitjudicem elegit ius, which allows the forum to
apply its own law, thus helpfully obviating the expense and delay that an
inquiry into foreign law inevitably entails."' 54  Article 8 of the Mexico
Convention, follows the provision in article 3(2) of the Rome Convention that
allows contracting parties to agree at any time to subject the contract to a law
other than that which previously governed it. "'
As with the Rome Convention, the drafters of the Mexico Convention
imposed certain limits upon the principle of party autonomy. The Mexico
Convention departs from its role model, however, in not enumerating specific
categories of protective laws vis a vis consumer and employment contracts, as
found in articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention. 5 6 Instead, the drafters of
the Mexico Convention relied, in article 11, on a more general provision that,
in itself, is sufficient to provide protection to buyers and employees, as well
as to other parties afforded protection under articles 5 and 6 of the Rome
Convention. 157  Article 11 permits a court to avoid application of the
convention by allowing the mandatory laws of the forum state to be applied.' 58
5'3 Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 7.
154 Juenger, supra note 9, at 388.
's See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
156 See Juenger, supra note 13, at 204. "Instead of setting for the narrowly circumscribed
conflict-of-law privileges for various categories of weaker parties, as the Rome Convention
does, article I I ... relied on a general clause." Id.
"7 Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 1I:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding articles, the provisions
of the law of the forum shall necessarily be applied when they .are
mandatory requirements. It shall be up to the forum to decide when it
applies the mandatory provisions of the law of another State with which
the contract has close ties.
See also Burman, supra note 9, at 382.
... See Burman, supra note 9, at 382.
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Additionally, article 11 permits the application of the mandatory law of a third
state, at the discretion of the forum state, when the contract is determined to
have close ties with that third state. 59 Again, the drafters of the Mexico
Convention have significantly departed from the Rome Convention. Article
18 acts as a further fetter to the application of the Mexico Convention on
similar grounds as article 11, save by invoking public order.' 6 '
V. THE CLOSEST CONNECTION
A. The Principle of Closest Connection
The principle of closest connection is embodied in article 4(1) of the Rome
Convention. 162 The principle operates when the parties have failed to either
expressly or impliedly stipulate the applicable law to govern the contract in
accordance with article 3.163 The applicable law to be applied to the contract
under article 4(1) is that of the country to which the contract has the closest
connection. In support thereof, articles 4(2) and 4(5) of the convention
establish a presumption that the applicable law is the law of the country with
the closest connections to the contract.16
In determining the law to be applied, article 4(1) permits a court to consider
events subsequent to contract formation in its determination of the country
159 See id.
160 See Juenger, supra note 1I, at 204 (stating that "[i]n marked contrast... the Mexico
Convention allows the contracting parties to choose a non-national law, such as the lex
mercatoria or its codified version, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts").
161 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 18; Burman, supra note 11, at 382 (noting
that "both of these grounds for non-application are common in the jurisprudence of most
countries; they also have state law precedents in the United States"); see also Juenger, supra
note 11, at 204 (commenting on the breadth of protection encompassed within article 11, which
allows "the decisionmaker to invoke forum as well as foreign 'rules of immediate application'
(or, as the convention calls them, "rules of public policy"), which take precedence over the
stipulated law, sufficiently protects these weaker parties against abuses of superior bargaining
power").
162 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(1): "To the Extent that the law applicable
to the contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be governed
by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected."
163 See PLENDER, supra note 13, § 6.01. See generally DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 79.
For an overview of the applicability of the principle in each of the Member States of the
European Union prior to its inclusion in the Rome Convention, see Giuliano-Lagarde Report,
supra note 11.
"A See Rome Convention, supra note 11, arts. 4(2) & 4(5).
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with the closest connection to the contract. 165 Thus, the issue is determined by
the features and effects of the contract that, if looked at independently, would
lead to a showing of closest connection to a country. This is a theoretical
departure from article 3(1) in which courts are permitted to look at subjective
factors to ascertain an intention of the contracting parties towards a possible
applicable conflict-of-law. 1
66
The flexibility the drafters imputed into the closest connection principle
embodied in article 4(1) is materially fettered not just by the presumptions
referred to above, but also by the precisely defined application of the principle
of d~pegage relating to severable contracts also found in article 4(1).167
B. D~peqage Under Article 4(1) of the Rome Convention
The drafters of the convention also applied the principle of d6pegage to the
determination of the applicable law in default of an express or implied
conflict-of-law by the contracting parties. 16' The principle as embodied in the
final sentence of article 4(1) provides that: "a severable part of a contract
which has a closer connection with another country may by way of exception
be governed by the system of law of that other country."' 169 Thus, the
cumulative effect of d6pegage in articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention
entails that the contracting parties can indicate either expressly or impliedly
through their conduct that they have chosen one legal system to govern just a
part of the contract as opposed to the whole contract. That part of the contract
so delineated will be governed by the system of law the parties have chosen to
apply. The remainder of the contract will be governed by the law of the
country having the closest connection to that part of the contract.170
The drafters of the convention were unanimous in their desire to discourage
the concept of severability.' 7' The drafters did agree, as a compromise, to
empower the courts to effect a severance of a contract solely as an exception
to the general rule of closest connection found in the first half of article 4(1).
6' See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note I1; PLENDER, supra note 13, § 6.04
(cautioning "that it does so only by implication and it cannot necessarily be assumed that the
Convention authorizes... courts to take account of post-contractual conduct irrespective of the
rules applied in this respect by putative applicable laws."
266 See Rome Convention supra note 11; KAYE, supra note 13, at 173.
167 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note II.
161 See Rome Convention, supra note 1I, art. 4(l).
169 id.
270 See PLENDER, supra note 13, § 6.05; KAYE, supra note 13, at 175-76.
272 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note II.
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That power of severance is restricted to that-part of a contract that is readily
identifiable as independent and separate and has a closer connection to another
country. 
7 2
One of the failings of the convention, in terms of clarity, is its failure to
define and fully establish the parameters of "severability" or whose legal
system is applied to establish whether a part of a contract can be severable.'7
Two possible theories exist to determine the applicable legal system to
ascertain the severability of a part of a contract. First, severability may be
determined in accordance with criteria that can be extracted from various
provisions in the convention.'74 Second, severability may be established in
accordance with the law governing the remainder."' The latter approach
appears more persuasive because a general premise of the convention is this:
the law governing the remainder of the contract would be "deemed inapplica-
ble to a part of the contract to which it would have been held to apply by a
court of that county, at least in a situation not involving a choice between the
laws of different countries."176
C. Characteristic Performance Under Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention
Article 4(2)177 implies that the most closely connected country is the
country where the party who is to effect performance of the contract, which is
characteristic of the contract, has his habitual residence. The characteristic
performance criteria in article 4(2) gives effect to two general theories. First,
in the absence of an express or implied choice of a system of law by the
parties, the contract should be governed by the law appropriate to its
characteristic performance. This connotes that the court in determining the
relevant law should restrict its investigation to the "four comers of the
contract." Second, encapsulated within the principle of characteristic
performance in article 4(2) is the general idea that performance by a party
172 Id.
17 See PLENDER, supra note 13, § 6.07; Kaye, supra note 13, at 175.
171 One author asked, "Is the test a purely physical one - a requirement that the severable
part be contained in separate words or clauses of the contract?" M. Pryles, Reflections on the
EEC Contractual Obligations Convention - An Australian Perspective, in CONTRACT
CONFLICTS: THE EEC CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 124, at 323, 333. See also PLENDER, supra note 13, § 6.07
(noting that "that the severability at a part of a contract ought to be established in accordance
with the law guessing the remainder").
' See PLENDER, supra note 13, § 6.07.
176 id.
177 See DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 79, at 1190.
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under the contract is referable "to the function which the legal relationship
involved fulfills in the economic and social life of any country."'
78
Article 4(2) imputes clarity to the principle of closest connection contained
in article 4(1). 179 Irrespective of the framers' intention to impute clarity to the
closest connection concept, in conceptualizing the principle of characteristic
performance and the inherent presumptions therein they have created several
interpretive problems. First, the framers have neither in the text of the
convention nor in the legislative history within the Giuliano-Lagarde Report
carved out a readily ascertainable objective meaning of "characteristic
performance."'' 0  Second, it is difficult to identify which performance
obligation within a contract is the most significant.
It is suggested that "characteristic" should be read as isolating within the
confines of the contract (a four corners approach), the most important of the
contractual obligations therein.' 8 ' The "most significant contractual
obligation" approach curries favor with the author. Under this definition of
"characteristic," the most significant contractual obligation is determined first,
by ascertaining which particular performance is the most important for that
type of contract and secondly, which performance is the most significant under
the actual contract in question. 82 In designating the performance obligation
that is the most significant under the contract, the obligation chosen should be
the one that is the central nexus of the contract, the one "whose character is the
overwhelming feature of the contract. " 81 In this connection, it is the second
of the general theories encapsulated within article 4(2) that a court must
consider in its determination, namely, "the function which the legal relation-
ship involved fulfills in the economic and social life of a country."
181
178 Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 1I.
1 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report supra note 1I; but cf PLENDER, supra note 13, § 6.10
(noting the widespread criticism of the characteristic performance concept that is chiefly
premised on the "grounds that the 'characteristic performance' of a contract may be difficult to
discover [and] that in referring to the habitual residence of the characteristic performer the
Convention assumes a uniformity that may not exist: and that the reference to a place of business
through which a contract is to be performed amounts to the unwarranted presumption of a place
of performance").
SO See KAYE, supra note 13, at 179.
... For a general consideration of the definal complexities of the term "characteristic" see
KAYE, supra note 13, at 179-80. Two basic definitions exist, one that confines the fact finder
to the four corners of the contract and the other that allows the fact finder to consider external
matters. Id.
182 Id. at 180.
183 Id.
84 Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 1I.
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The application of the general principles of "characteristic performance"
to identify the most significant contractual obligation in unilateral contracts is
a relatively simple process. In a unilateral contract only one party is bound by
a contractual obligation to perform under the contract. It is this contractual
obligation that constitutes characteristic performance.' 85 However, in a
bilateral contract characterized by mutual reciprocal obligations of each party,
the counter-performance usually takes the form of the payment of money.
This counter-performance does not constitute the characteristic performance
of the contract. It is the performance by the party, which in turn generates the
counter-performance to pay, which constitutes the characteristic performance
of the contract. 86 In those contracts in which it is not possible to ascertain a
characteristic performance, pursuant to article 4(5), article 4(2) is deemed
inapplicable. 87
The applicable system of law under article 4(2) that is deemed the most
closely connected to the contract, is not that of the country in which the
characteristic performance of the contract is to occur; rather, it is the system
of law of the country in which the characteristic performer habitually resides
or of the central administration or place of business. '88 In the event article 4(2)
is deemed inapplicable, the system of law of the country in which the contract
will be performed prevails. 8 9 This presumption is subject to rebuttal where
there is more than one country that can be classified as "closely connected."' 9
Then, it is the system of law of the country of characteristic performance that
is applied.' 9' However, where the characteristic performer is a "trader" or
"professional," and a contract is formed in the course of such trade or
profession, the system of law of the country of the trader or professional or
principal place of business is presumed to be the system of law most closely
connected to the contract. 92 However, in the event it is agreed in the contract
that contractual performance will take place in a different country and through
a separate place of business, the system of law that is presumed the most
closely connected is that of the country where the different place of business
is situated. 9' The rules of presumption pertaining to whether the system of
'85 See id.; see also KAYE, supra note 13, at 181.
186 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note II.
7 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(5).
185 See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11.
'9 See id.
190 See id.
91 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id.
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law of the country of the principal or other place of business only apply when
the trader or professional are classified as the characteristic performer of the
contract. 1
94
D. The Rebuttable Presumptions ofArticles 4(3) and (4)
Article 4(3) stipulates that the presumption embodied within article 4(2)
does not apply to contracts dealing with immovable property. 95 In such
contracts, the framers adopted a presumption that the contract is most closely
connected with the country where the immovable property is situated.
96
Likewise with article 4(2), the presumption is rebuttable under article 4(5) if
the contract appears to be more closely connected to the system of law of
another country. 97
In article 4(4), which is specifically referable to contracts for the carriage
of goods, the characteristic performance presumption in article 4(2) is not
applicable.'98 In the absence of an express or implied conflict-of-law by the
parties under article 4(1), the law applicable to a contract for the carriage.of
goods is presumed to be the law of the country in which, at the time of
contractual conclusion, the carrier had his principal place of business and the
place of loading, the place of discharge, or the consignors principal place of
business.' 99 The presumption as to the applicable system of law in article 4(4)
is also rebuttable by article 4(5) where the contract is more closely connected
to the system of law of another country. 00
E. The Theory of "Closest Connection" Under the Mexico Convention
In marked contrast to the principle of party autonomy found in article 7, the
drafters of the Mexico Convention did not follow as closely the principle of
"closest connection" espoused in the Rome Convention.2' Article 9 of the
Mexico Convention adopts what is termed the "closest ties" theory in
determining which system of law shall apply to the contract in the absence of
4 See id.; see also KAYE, supra note 13, at 183-85; PLENDER, supra note 13, § 6.10.
'95 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(3).
196 See id. art. 4(5).
'9' See Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11.
98 See Rome Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(4).
'99 See id.
200 See id. art. 4(5); see also Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 11.
20 See Juenger, supra note 9, at 389; Burman, supra note 9, at 381.
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an express or implied conflict-of-law by the parties to the contract.0 2 The
"closest ties" concept is a concept akin to that of the "closest connection"
found in the Rome Convention. However, the Mexico Convention departs
from the objectivity principles in article 4(2) of the Rome Convention when
it empowers the fact finder to look at both objective and subjective criteria to
ascertain the system of law of the state with which the contract has the closest
ties.2"3 This departure from the objective approach taken by the framers of the
Rome Convention to the determination of the factors within a contract that
constitute the closest connection provides the fact finder with a much broader
platform upon which to ascertain the applicable system of law to govern the
contract.
20 4
In addition, the framers of the Mexico Convention departed from the
concept of characteristic performance also found in article 4(2) of the Rome
Convention. In so doing, the framers made their most radical departure from
the principles laid down in the Rome Convention. In this departure, the
framers directed the fact finder in the second sentence of article 9(2) to take
into account, along with all objective and subjective elements, the general
principles of international commercial law recognized by international
organizations. 2 5 The adoption of this objective and subjective criteria in place
of the Rome Convention's objective characteristic performance formula was
largely motivated by the perceived failings of that formula.2 6 The result
202 See Mexico Convention, supra note 9, art. 9(2) ("If the parties have not selected the
applicable law, or if their election proves ineffective, the contract shall be governed by the law
of the state with which it has the closest ties.").
203 See id. ("The court will take into account all objective and subjective elements of the
contract to determine the law of the state with which it has the closest ties.").
204 See Juenger, supra note 11, at 205 ("[T]his provision grants the judge or arbitrator a
wider leeway of discretion than the Rome Convention."); see also Juenger, supra note 9, at 389
(discussing the effect of including a subjective criteria and arguing that "[t]he reference to
"subjective elements" would seem to include the possibility of taking into account the parties'
'hypothetical' or 'presumed' intent").
205 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2); Burman, supra note 9, at 381.
206 For a discussion of the deficiencies of the characteristic principle, see generally KAYE,
supra note 13, at 187-91:
Article 4(2) has been subject to a great deal of criticism[;] ... there are
three main species of objection which have ranged against this system.
First, the characteristic obligation doctrine is said to derive from certain
Swiss formulations, designed to avoid the German System, incorporat-
ing scission of applicable law in the absence of choice .... Secondly,
presumptions take away much of the flexibility gained from the basic
rule in Article 4(1), and consequently fell out of fashion, as being
wrong in principle, under pre-existing English contract conflicts.
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achieved by the framers of the convention permits the fact finder to "select that
law which best accords with substantial justice and the exigencies of
international commerce. 2 °7
The concepts the drafters of the convention included in article 9 are
buttressed by those in article 10, which also enable the fact finder to determine
the applicable law of the contract, with a view to discharging the requirements
of justice and equity in the particular case to give consideration to the
guidelines, customs, and principles of international commercial law. 20 ' The
adoption of this article represents, in the spirit of the principles adopted in
article 9, an endorsement of custom and the principles of good faith and fair
dealing which underpin the theory of substantial justice contained within the
UNIDROIT Principles.20 9
VI. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RATIFY THE MEXICO CONVENTION
A. The Mexico Convention Constitutes a Body ofInternational Uniform Laws
There has existed since the 1950s an emerging trend for the unification of
the laws governing transnational contracts.10 Quite simply, this trend is driven
not just by the certainty of law that such unification promotes but also, and
probably more importantly from a commercial interest, it enhances the flow
of international trade.21' This trend is evinced by the 1964 Hague Convention,
CISG, the 1980 Rome Convention, and the 1994 Mexico Convention, among
others.212
In developing this uniform body of private international law, the emphasis
is on transcending the vagaries of national law to develop a uniform and
Thirdly, if there is a presumption as to applicable law, it ought not to
have been permitted to be rebutted, which effectively removes whatever
certainty - if any - it brings; the rule of closest connection in Article
4(l) mightjust as well have stood alone, without the need to go through
the presumptive process, eventually returning to the original starting
point of the closest connection.
207 Juenger, supra note II, at 206; see also Juenger, supra note 9, at 391 (noting that this
result "allows decisionmakers to dispense with a tedious investigation into the subtleties of
conflicting laws and to rely instead on the rules laid down in the UNIDROIT Principles.").
20' See Mexico Convention, supra note 9, art. 10.
209 See Juenger, supra note 9, at 392.
2 0 See Burman, supra note 9, at 367.
211 See Ferrari, supra note 121, at 4, 4 nn.2-3.
212 See Hague Convention, supra note 121; CISG, supra note 121; Rome Convention, supra
note I1; Mexico Convention, supra note 2.
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universally acceptable body of international commercial principles subject to
a uniformity of interpretation by each country's judiciary not hitherto possible
with the application of national rules of interpretation. So, how is this
uniformity created? First, it is inadequate for uniform laws to be simply
promulgated and subsequently ratified by the states party to the treaty. The
interpretation and effect given to such laws will inevitably be at the mercy of
judicial interpretation in each ratifying nation."1 3 To circumvent this
multitudinous interpretation of international uniform laws it must be expressly
stated in the convention that such laws are not to be subject to interpretation
by the application of each nation's domestic law.21 4 Instead, regard must be
had in the interpretation and application of such uniform laws to the interna-
tional character and to the desirability of achieving uniformity in their
interpretation and application,215 or, pursuant to articles 9 and 10 of the Mexico
Convention, regard must be had to "the general principles of international
commercial law ... [and to the] guidelines, customs and principles of
international commercial law as well as commercial usage and practices
generally accepted."
2 16
In addition to achieving uniformity of interpretation under the auspices of
the international character and pursuant to general international commercial
principles, regard must also be had to the judicial decisions of the courts of
other contracting states to the treaty or convention." 7 Where the courts of
other contracting states have previously dealt with an issue arising under a
treaty or convention, such decisions should carry precedential value, if an
23 See R.J.C. Munday, Comment, The Uniform Interpretation of International Conven-
tions, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 450, 450 (1978). The author notes:
The principal objective of an international convention is to achieve
uniformity of legal rules within the various States party to it. However,
even when outward uniformity is achieved following the adoption of a
single authoritative text, uniform application of the agreed rules is by
no means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost inevitably
come to put different interpretations upon the same enacted words. Id.
214 See John 0. Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action, Uniform International Words:
Uniform Application? 8 J.L. & CoM. 207, 208 (1988) ("[O]ne threat to international uniformity
in interpretation is a natural tendency to read the international text through the lenses of
domestic law.").
215 See Rome Convention, supra note I1, art. 18; Ferrari, supra note 121, at 9-10; CISG,
supra note II, art. 7(2).
216 Mexico Convention, supra note 9, arts. 9 & 10.
27 See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniformn Sales Law, 24 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 204-05 (1994).
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existing body of international case law exists, or at the least should have
persuasive value.18
The Mexico Convention as a conflict of laws convention constitutes an
internationally agreed upon body of international commercial principles
designating the law governing international contracts.219 In approving the
convention, each member state made a commitment to continue the progres-
sive development and codification of private international law among each
member state, and to "[reassert] the advisability of harmonizing solutions to
international trade issues."22 ° As such, the convention should be ratified by the
United States and take its place among the growing body of international
uniform laws.22'
B. The Influence of the United States in Framing the Mexico Convention
The essential principles of the convention are the freedom of parties to
choose the applicable law to govern a contract,222 and, in default of either an
express or implied conflict-of-law by the parties, the "contract shall be
governed by the law of the State with which is has the closest ties." '223 The rule
of law adopted in article 7 of the convention received United States support
notwithstanding its derogation from more restrictive principles embodied
within both the Restatement (Second) and the U.C.C.
2 2 4
218 See Ferrari, supra note 121, at 12.
219 In defining the convention, Burman stipulated that it "forms a body of internationally
agreed upon resolutions of legal problems arrived at between representatives of a number of
countries, including many of [the United States'] trading partners.... As such, [the] Convention
[is] a source of transnational legal norms that may be applied directly in foreign jurisdictions."
Burman, supra note 9, at 375-76. For a list of those nations who are a party to OAS, see supra
note I.
220 Mexico Convention, supra note 2, at 733.
22 Discussing the effect of the Mexico Convention on the recent trend towards the
harmonization of international private law, Harold Burman noted that "we are moving, though
slowly, away from the concept that applicable law is inherently limited only to national laws,
or those treaty provisions within formally ratified documents. Recognition and application of
internationally approved norms can allow a modem lex nmercatoria to develop more fully."
Burman, supra note 9, at 387. No doubt, the ratification of the Mexico Convention will, with
regard to the harmonization of conflicts-of-laws rules, advance this trend more rapidly.
222 See Mexico Convention, supra note 2, art. 7.
221 Id. art. 9.
224 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 9, § 187; U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1998). See
generally Burman, supra note 9, at 380-81 (affirming United States approval of article 7 because
it is "consistent with trends in certain areas of modem conflicts law as it relates to particular
commercial practices").
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Article 9 of the Mexico Convention was a compromise solution adopted by
the framers. The United States delegation to the Mexico Convention proposed,
in the event the parties to a contract failed either expressly or impliedly to
chose an applicable law to govern the contract, that the contract be governed
by "general principles of international commercial law accepted by interna-
tional organizations., 225 The compromise adopted in article 9(2) retained the
proper legal approach proposed by the United States delegation but relegated
the status of general principles of international commercial law to a factor to
be taken into consideration by the factfinder, rather than the overriding
consideration in determining the applicable law.226 Nevertheless, the
overriding principle conforms to the American prerogative. 7
Likewise, article 10 of the convention resulted from a proposal of the
United States delegation.228 It is considered one of the most innovative
provisions in the convention.229 The intention of article 10 is "to increase the
extent to which the intentions of commercial parties and the development of
business usages that are commonly recognized in international, if not in
domestic, commerce would be recognized by the Convention.' 230 The most
pertinent provision in the convention was adopted as a direct result of
proposals by the United States delegation. 1
C. The Improvement the Mexico Convention Represents Over the Principles
of the Rome Convention
The principle of party autonomy embodied in article 7 of the Mexico
Convention, as well as numerous other international treaties and conventions,
is indispensable to the conduct of international trade. Along with its cohorts,
choice of forum and arbitration clauses, it provides a solution to the interna-
225 Juenger, supra note 9, at 391.
226 The opposition to the United States' proposal was due to concern that it would create
uncertainty arising out of a perceived difficulty for national judges to apply the principles. See
Veytia, supra note 12, at 1194-95.
227 See id.
221 See Burman, supra note 9, at 381.
229 See id.
230 Id. Burman further stipulates that the "the purpose was... to establish provisions aimed
at facilitating commerce by engaging through the Convention those business practices that
underlie much of international trade." Id.
231 For an overview of the approach taken by the United States delegation, see Burman,
supra note 9, at 378.
514 [Vol. 27:477
ARGUMENT FOR RATIFICATION
tional commercial problems that arise out of a diversity of legal and judicial
systems.232
With regard to the concept of party autonomy, what distinguishes the
Mexico Convention from the Rome Convention is the freedom it allows the
contracting parties to choose a system of law not connected to the country of
either party. 233 "Such freedom of choice is better attuned to the modem
commercial realities than the Rome Convention's retrogressive insistence on
limiting the parties' selection to positive laws., 234 This liberal view of party
autonomy strikes a cord with what is suggested and is the current trend in
American conflict-of-lawsjurisprudence,235 namely "conflicts pragmatism. 236
The premise of the emerging theory can be seen in Friedrich Juenger's
arguments for a more relaxed view towards contractual conflict-of-law in the
current review of the UCC. 237 Juenger advocates that the parties to the contract
should be free to choose the law of any jurisdiction, subject only to public
policy limitations.238 In contrast, Kramer advocates a more limited party
autonomy provision in the UCC that would limit the parties to choosing
between the laws of interested states, defined as "states that bear some
substantial connection to the parties or the dispute., 239 Hence, Kramer's
theory does not contemplate the concept of a neutral conflict-of-law provision.
In contrast, the concept of neutral conflict-of-law clauses has begun to find
favor in the courts in the United States.24° It is suggested that the difficulty in
232 See Juenger, supra note 11, at 195-97.
233 See Juenger, supra note 11, at 204 (noting that "the Mexico Convention allows the
contracting parties to choose a non-national law, such as lex ,nercatoria or its codified version,
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts").
24 Id. at 204-05.
235 Proponents of this trend include Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of
Contractual Cotficts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1995); But cf. Kramer, supra note
79, at 1003-1012 (arguing against this modem trend); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice-of- Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 328 (1990) (arguing that party autonomy should be limited in
contractual conflicts).
236 Borchers, supra note 235, at 437. Borchers distinguishes between a conflicts
pragmatism doctrine and legal positivism. The doctrinal differences between the two is aptly
chronicled by Borchers in scholastic exchanges between Kramer and Juenger.
237 See Borchers, supra note 235, at 435. At present, § 1-105 of the UCC requires that the
parties select a law with which the transaction has a reasonable relationship. See U.C.C. § I -
105.
238 See Borchers, supra note 235, at 435.
239 Id. (discussing letters from Kramer to Harry Sigman in 1994).
240 See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Borchers, supra note
235, at 436 (noting that "[r]elatively few U.S. cases have endorsed conflict-of-law clauses
pointing to the law of jurisdictions with little or no connection to the dispute").
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the conflict "pragmatists doctrine" "lies in trying to identify the reasons for
allowing parties to select, at least in some circumstances, the law applicable
to the transaction.' '24 ' The theoretical underpinnings of the debate are the
positivistic and nonpositivistic theories. 42 Under the latter theory, party
autonomy resembles a rule of substance that finds commonality with many
states in the United States and sovereign states.243 Its premise is that greater
certainty and predictability ensues in allowing parties the freedom to choose
the applicable law to the contract.2 44 In this regard, the author supports the
nonpositivistic approach favored by Borchers and Juenger. In particular, if the
theoretical debate is transposed to the international arena, allowing the parties
to choose a neutral law carries more weight. Contract conflict rules will
inevitably vary between different countries, and the ability of the parties to
choose a neutral system of law may save the deal.245
The Mexico Convention embraces the nonpositivistic approach presently
rising in eminence in the United States. In doing so, the convention aligns
itself with several international conventions that also allow the parties to
choose a neutral system of law.246 Accordingly, because the "weight of
authority internationally is to allow parties to select the law of an unconnected
state, 2 47 the United States should ratify the convention.
In the absence of an effective conflict-of-law by the parties, article 9 of the
convention adopts the commonly used closest-ties formula and dispenses with
the concept of characteristic performance found in the Rome Convention. The
second sentence of article 9 is an innovative approach adopted by the
241 Borchers, supra note 235, at 437.
242 The positivistic theory asserts the exclusive supremacy of the sovereign state as a source
of rights and duties. See Borchers, supra note 235, at 437. The nonpositivistic approach allows
for the possibility of activities playing a role in defining legal rights and duties. In this regard,
limiting the parties to choosing between legal systems that might potentially apply anyway is
not a sensible limitation. Id.
243 See id.
244 See Borchers, supra note 235, at 437 ("If one sees this 'shared multistage interest' as the
ultimate foundation for party autonomy, however, the idea of limiting the parties to choosing
between bodies of law that might potentially apply is not a sensible limitation.").
245 In advocating the need for a neutral system of law in international contracts, Borchers
noted that "the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly recognized this concern in Zapata because a large
part of the choice of an English court (a neutral forum) was a desire to avoid the application of
the Bisso doctrine by a U.S. court." Id. at 438.
246 See Ferrari, supra note 121, at 84 ("Notwithstanding the presence of all the requirements
for the application of the Convention, the CISG does not necessarily have to apply."); see also
Borchers, supra note 235, at 438 ("One feature of the recently completed UNIDROIT Principles
... is that these principles invite parties to choose them with a conflict-of-law clause.").
247 Borchers, supra note 235, at 438.
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convention in that it requires the general principles of international commer-
cial law recognized by international organizations to be taken into consider-
ation in determining the applicable law.248  The convention indirectly
incorporates the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts.2 9 By incorporating the UNIDROIT Principles, the convention
adopts principles of contract law common to numerous jurisdictions or
principles that have been "adapted to the exigencies of international
commerce." 25° The convention should prove to be a proficient guide to what
law should be applicable to commercial contracts.
Furthermore, by reference to the customs and principles of international
law as well as commercial usage and practices in article 10, the drafters of the
Mexico Convention also incorporated by reference lex mercatoria. Unlike the
Rome Convention, the Mexico Convention places reliance on generally
accepted commercial practices, which are binding on the parties. "The Inter-
American Convention opens new perspectives for the application of the
general principles of commercial law in the international sphere.
' 251
In so radically departing from the principles of "closest connection" and
"characteristic performance" in the Rome Convention, the framers of the
Mexico Convention have taken it out of the quagmire of being merely a
"local" convention onto the much higher plane of international integration,
with an emerging body of international commercial law that stands out on its
own above the vagaries inherent in applying the national law of a country. For
this reason, along with the added benefit of certainty and harmonization the
adoption of such a law imputes, the convention should be ratified.
VII. CONCLUSION
The arguments in support of ratification begin with a comparison of the
similarity between the two conventions. Both exclude the doctrine of renvoi
and, in turn, adopt the principle of party autonomy. It is the inclusion and
exclusion of these principles and the recognition of general principles of
internationally recognized conventions and treaties, including lex mercatoria,
248 This provision has been termed "one of the greatest accomplishments of the Mexico
Convention" as the general principles of international commercial law "were conceived as
accepted norms designed especially for governing international transactions." Veytia, supra
note 12, at 1196.
249 See Veytia, supra note 12, at 1195; Juenger, supra note 9, at 391; Parra-Aranguren,
supra note 12, at 1250.
250 Veytia, supra note 12, at 1196-97.
211 Parra-Aranguren, supra note 12, at 125 .
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to determine the system of law to govern the contract in the absence of an
express or implied choice, which give the Mexico Convention its credibility.
The emergence of an international body of uniform rules and principles
straddling atop the national laws of each sovereign state must be recognized
and applied in the ever-expanding world market place to add certainty and
uniformity in the sphere of international trade.
